Five years after Fidel Castro’s separation from power, it is essential to examine the role that the former revolutionary leader has played in the current Cuban political system from his convalescence and retirement, and the consequences of this evolution.

The fundamental role of Fidel Castro in the Cuban political system today is two-fold: 1) In terms of government, Fidel Castro is the great counselor, to be consulted on strategic decisions or with respect to the appointment or removal of central leaders, as was the case in the termination of the political careers of his former associates Felipe Perez and Carlos Lage and in the constitution of the new Central Committee at the Sixth Congress, 2) In terms of ideology and international projection, particularly in Latin America, he is a Patriarch of the radical left, advising the new leaders, especially Hugo Chavez, and reflecting on some of the past mistakes made by this political sector (in his Reflections and interviews he has criticized discrimination against homosexuals, hostility toward the market, and Ahmadinejad's anti-Semitism that has been repeated in many of the anti-Israeli condemnations by the radical Latin American left).

Unlike Mao in China and Stalin in the Soviet Union, Fidel Castro seems comfortable with his planned succession. He acts as a chairman emeritus of a corporation, sometimes visiting projects and taking part in few, but important decisions. He has basically entrusted Raul Castro with the fate of the project he founded. He knows that his younger brother and the alliance of military leaders and party czars are in full control of the FAR, the PCC, the intelligence and counterintelligence units, and the entire State.

In the absence of the charismatic leader and with the initiation of necessary economic and political reforms, Cuba enters a new period where the influence of institutions and the outlooks of different groups within the ruling elite will gain importance. Nobody should underestimate the survival capacity of the party system in Cuba. No organization across the in the entire Cuban spectrum, on the island or in the diaspora has the strength, discipline, organization and mobilization capacity of the PCC-FAR duo. In fact, in order to deal with his legacy, those who oppose Fidel Castro will have to recognize his political talent and even learn from it.

Fidel Castro is no longer, by himself, the minimal winning coalition in Cuba’s decision making. The fate of the current one-party system is increasingly dependent on the ability of the post-Fidel leadership to solve the problems of general welfare and to fulfill the aspirations of the population, rather than the opinions or the charisma of the revolutionary patriarch. With this evolution emerges a different kind of politics-- a bureaucratic pluralism where the interests and values ​​of thedifferent factions of the government gain relevance. Cuba was never a sultanistic system but the retirement of Fidel, the charismatic leader, marks the transformation of the Cuban political regime toward post-totalitarianism[i].

This reality implies not only political adjustments, but also tensions that can divide and weaken the cohesion among the elite. Reforms can destroy reformist governments. In Cuba, the interests, experiences, values ​​and education of the generationalgroups that make up the current elite are not homogeneous. Even if the reform does succeed, something that no one can guarantee, given the current difficult conditions and the time lost by the ruling elite since the end of Soviet support in 1991 - a Cuba with a mixed economy and a society that partially revokes its egalitarian programs will prompt new modernizing demands. Periods of market-oriented economic growth have always generated pressure for political liberalization.

From the standpoint of U.S. policy, what has happened is just as important as what has not. An orderly transition in Cuba to a model other than Fidel-at-the-helm is in progress, with none of the riots anticipated and even desired by many analysts in Washington and Miami. Washington, however, continues its historical course of not missing an opportunity to miss an opportunity, in this case, to bolster the reform processes taking place on the island. That said, relaxation of restrictions on travel to the island by the Obama Administration and numerous articles in the US press demonstrate that some are beginning to take notice of a country that is less a museum of the Cold War and more a country in transition.

What will happen in Cuba when Fidel Castro dies? A funeral. In the short term, one can predict with relative certainty: 1) there will not be a collapse of government in Havana, regardless of how long the older Castro stays with us or the younger Castro remains in good health, 2) a process of economic reform and liberalization toward a greater role of the market and private property has been initiated along with a partial expansion of economic and social pluralism, freedom of religion and travel, and property ownership, 3) Raul Castro, together with his First Vice President Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, will play the leading role in determining the third Cuban head of state since 1959. The new leader will rule for a maximum of two terms with powers that are more shared than that of his two predecessors.

Faced with this prognosis, the international community and the Cuban diaspora would be wise to pursue a policy of proactive engagement -- as suggested by dissident analyst and former Cuban diplomat Miriam Leyva[ii]- with all of Cuban society, recognizing its plurality and the growing room for independent initiative within the government, which is also a plural terrain with differing views on governance. From this realist point of departure, it is increasingly irrational to conceive policies in Cuba and toward Cuba that target Fidel Castro[iii], to settle accounts with him or with the post-revolutionary State he founded.

This article was translated from Spanish by Dawn Gable.