There are Cuban individuals both on and off the island who are disgusted by the Castro regime and who do not want to see any reforms in Cuba, but rather hope that the deteriorating situation will galvanize discontent and provoke a rebellion. There are others in Cuba, enjoying the privileges of the Communist system, who do not want any reforms so that they can go on enjoying the status granted them due to family ties, loyalty or simply ideological opportunism. Still, there are many others who would like to see Cuba initiate orderly reforms that gradually lead to a political and economic system consistent with all human rights-- civil and political, economic, cultural and social-- enshrined in the Universal Declaration.

The principal report to the VI Congress of the Communist Party, presented by Raul Castro, points to a Cuba in which none of the three groups may be satisfied. The proposed reform program inserts economic change into single-party political continuity. This formulation implies that it is possible to advance in terms of legitimacy, freedom and welfare in some areas, while in other areas there is no progress, or even reinforcement of authoritarianism. It envisages a Cuba that might combine prosperity and joyful consumption of market-oriented economic growth with the permanence of reprehensible acts of repudiation against political dissidents.

The dilemmas of economic reform

The Central Report to the PCC Congress reflects a set of proposals generally associated with unorthodox propositions by government supporters. Positions in favor of term limits, decentralization, revaluation of the market as a development tool, separation of party and state functions, increasing the representation of women, blacks, mestizos and youth in government leadership and in favor of checks and balances between the branches of government and the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) have been present in Cuba's internal debates since the 80's.

In practice, the transition to a mixed economy model with a decentralized state and a major non-state sector, considered in the past as antithetical to the official communist ideology, has already begun. President Raul Castro has taken (some would say stolen) agendas promoted in the past by reformist groups or even opponents and has set out to implement them under the leadership of the PCC. It will be a challenge for a bureaucracy, steeped in hostility toward these very concepts, to do so.

Market oriented reforms and a reduction of the State's distributive role had already been decided. The questions put to the PCC concerned the speed, methods, sequence, scope and progression of the reforms. The report lacks clear answers. It insinuates a gradual approach by ruling out IMF-style shock therapy and sudden removal of the ration card. But there is still no overall vision or alternative economic model put forward and no discussion of the political risks that the PCC will face in implementing changes.

If, as the report states, contracts will be the "regulatory tool of interrelationships between economic actors," the government is way behind on legislation to accommodate this. There are no viable bankruptcy laws, credible legal mechanisms for dispute resolution between creditors and borrowers, or adequate consumer protection or antitrust laws.

Has the PCC adopted an economic model in which State, cooperative or private enterprises can go bust? How will the government respond when a borrower does not repay a loan? What are the rules for restructuring debt in the shortest time possible or accessing seized assets? What assets will be used as collateral when seeking credit?

To solve these problems, the report proposes the creation of a 'Reform Implementation and Development Permanent Government Commission' that includes a legal team that would propose changes to laws and even to the constitution. The Commission seems to be the authority with the strategic power to design the reforms, which has so far taken place in an ad-hoc manner with specific responses to demands generated by the changes, such as the creation of a credit market for private producers and an increase in lands granted under Decree 259.

In the first place, the credibility of this commission will depend on who its members are and on what rank they hold, particularly its chairman, in the party and government structure. At the end of the Congress, Marino Murillo, the president of the Commission, was promoted to the Politburo. His rise, however, is not necessarily a personal blessing given that the position will require clashing with the bureaucracy and the establishment. He'll make a lot of enemies, but someone has to take on the narrow and focused role to promote and coordinate the changes.

Political Adjustment associated with the economic reform.

A third of Raul Castro’s speech to Congress discussed the need for a change in mentality and a change of cadres. The adoption of term limits (two periods of five years) represents a historic step towards the creation of institutional forms of leadership. The PCC has agreed that a non-charismatic type of leadership requires the institutionalization of the presidential succession process, term limits, and a balance of powers.

This is the beginning of a political liberalization that replaces the model of "Fidel at the helm" with a dynamic of institutional pluralism and bureaucratic politics in which generational, regional, and sectoral grouping within the government will be more relevant. In the short term, the report warns that there is no properly prepared "pool of substitutes" available, so the task over the next five years will be to create a generational change even among the top leadership of the government and the PCC. This approach paves the way for a second secretary from the historic generation, leaving the seat vacant, or simply naming several second secretaries for now.

In addition, Raul's proposal of an institutionalized policy of party promotion implies a rejection of the advancement "by helicopter" of young leaders to key positions typical under Fidel, some of whose top-ranking leaders like Roberto Robaina, Felipe Pérez and Carlos Lage were chosen in youth organization conferences and elevated directly to ministries or to the Commander in Chief Support Group and from there to Cabinet positions in government.

A consistent trend in the report is to emphasize the technical preparation of the PCC and government ranks, especially in the economic field. Raul mentioned introducing accounting and economics courses into party schools and the system of cadre promotion, step by step, from the basics, focusing on areas of specialization. In the administration of the State, he emphasized technical expertise while criticizing the tacit requirement of communist militancy in order to hold senior positions in the State apparatus. It's the end of the famous popular joke "he who knows, knows and he who doesn't, is the boss."

The references in the speech to the PCC statutes and to the role of committees in the renovation of the government and the PCC structures based on new regulatory, planning and reporting systems reflects an intention to institutionalize the party and assertively exercise constitutional norms. Here is an implicit criticism of volunteerism, characteristic of Fidelista leadership. Raul Castro's report proposes holding regular full Central Committee meetings at least twice a year, with discussions about the progress of the economic reform. National Assembly sessions would evaluate reform progress and economic plan compliance.

Few challenges appear greater for the PCC than the issue of separating its functions from the regulatory and supervisory roles of the executive administration of the State. It is an old issue aired sporadically but never resolved. One of the biggest impediments to this separation is Article 74 of the Constitution which binds the functions of the president of the Council of State to that of the Council of Ministers. Will the Implementation and Development Commission recommend the separation of these functions? Will this be one of the constitutional reforms that Raul Castro alluded to?

Guidelines to orient the work of the PCC in the coming years

Evidence of a change in mentality is found in that the PCC's report drew its ideological limit not at the existence or promotion of private property but at its concentration, which would be- in their view- incompatible with socialism. This wording shows that the ideological boundaries have moved and that the dynamics unleashed by the reform process can move them again.

Unlike the V Congress which saw self-employment as a necessary concession to the market for the sake of political survival, this report hailed the 200,000 new non-state work permits granted since October as a success. For the first time, it was said that the promotion, support and protection of the non-state sector should be a priority for authorities, "at all levels."

Do not underestimate the role of discussion about these economic and social policy guidelines and their reformulation during the process of mass debate. According to the report, the bulk of the objections to the proposed policies are related to the welfare of the population: "social policy" (the food ration book and the implementation of layoffs being the most concerning), "macroeconomic policies" (housing and transportation) and the "economic management model". It is encouraging that the people continue to prioritize education and healthcare and that the government has reaffirmed its commitment to maintain them. (P.7)

International Relations

The international content lacks references to China and Vietnam, with the thematic emphasis on Latin American integration.

Relations with the United States were the center of attention in this section, in which the only novel item was a short reference to how "the current administration has taken some positive steps, but extremely limited." This assertion was accompanied by a relatively extensive history, for a document of twenty-odd pages, on U.S. aggression toward Cuba over the last fifty years. It is clear that this recap of history sought to refute Obama's proposal in Chile to begin a new phase with a clean slate.

The congress ratified the party view that the embargo is totally discredited internationally and, most importantly, that the PCC will not make political concessions seeking modifications to it.

Nationalism and PCC-Civil Society Relations

The report described the recent release of prisoners and dialogue with the Catholic Church as contributions to "national unity," a concept the PCC prefers to "national reconciliation" promoted by various religious communities including the Catholic Church and moderate sectors of the diaspora and of the internal opposition.

The praise over the dialogue with Cardinal Ortega and the President of the Conference of Bishops Monsignor Dionisio Garcia symbolized a new era in the relationship between the PCC and the most relevant actors of civil society. The reference to the dialogue with the Church hierarchy "whose opinions are not always consistent with ours" also offered a mode of interaction with "mutual respect, loyalty and transparency" that could be extended to other actors within the country and the émigré communities.

The condition for dialogue is not the acceptance of Marxist ideology but common, mature nationalism, particularly in the defense of national independence. This formulation leads to many important questions that might serve as indicators of the progress and the will to reform: Will the government extend economic reform and the idea of "national unity" to all Cubans in Cuba as well as those in the diaspora who reject the embargo and its interventionist supporters? Will there be the flexibility to develop a dialogue of "mutual respect, loyalty and transparency" with those nationalist whose ideological opinions are not "always consistent" with theirs? Will the Cuban migration policy be adjusted to this policy statement on national unity?

Living with ambiguity

President Raul Castro has suggested at least a partial acceptance of pluralism and economic initiative within the framework of a one-party system. How long will it last? How can you let the economic half of the genie out of the bottle while holding the political half under control?

As demonstrated by China, Vietnam, Taiwan, and the PRI's Mexico, this game of separating economic and political freedom is possible but risky. Ultimately, economic reforms generate strong pressures for political change. One of the most undervalued secrets shared by all these countries is that in parallel with the economic changes it was necessary to gradually create political openings, which, at least in the last two cases, led to democracies with competitive elections.

Whatever the long-term dynamic, the island has entered a situation in which the welfare and economic independence of the people can increase while certain authoritarian traits are maintained or reinforced. Cuba has not become a tolerant democracy but a significant expansion of economic freedom has begun. The actors in favor of a Cuba that is more open to the world and to its citizens will have to live with that ambiguity.

- This article was published in Spanish at Cubaencuentro.com and translated by Dawn Gable.