The fourth round of U.S.-Cuban migration talks wrapped up in Havana this week, with just two newsworthy tidbits.  The Cuban government allowed Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson to visit with the American USAID subcontractor, Alan Gross, who has been detained in Cuba for more than one year now without charges, and, Jacobson and the American delegation visited with Cuban dissidents, in spite of the Cuban government's request that they not do so.  The latter evoked an angry response from Cuba's foreign ministry, which described the U.S. delegation's visit as a "flagrant violation of the international norms and principles" under which the two countries should operate (my translation below):

"This act confirms once again that there's no change in the U.S. policy of subversion and interference in Cuban internal affairs, and that its priority continues to be to encourage internal counterrevolution and promote destabalizing activities, while it intensifies the embargo and the persecution of Cuban financial and comercial transactions around the world."

When this same thing happened last year, right down to the immediate and angry "we asked you not to" response from Cuba, I concluded it was all essentially a show; Cuba asks the U.S. not to use the occasion of diplomatic talks to visit (and, as they see it, elevate) internal critics, the U.S. delegation went ahead anyway, and Cuba threw a fit on principle.  I still believe that to be the case, but I don't see the Cuban concerns, particularly as expressed this year, as cosmetic.  What they are essentially saying is, 'you Americans come here (and leave here) saying how willing you are to cooperate with us, but out of the other side of your mouth, while you're still standing on Cuban soil, you make only gestures of disrespect, and oh by the way, in just this last year you've been trying to strangle us even harder than before - what gives?' 

It might be a bit of Kabuki theater, but I find myself wondering if the Cuban side has decided to put up with these visits not because they don't really care (what impact do they truly have?) but because that's the price they must pay for continued talks.  While we haven't seen a big agreement signing come out of these talks, they are an important way to raise concerns and build trust.  And with big changes underway in Cuba, and the potential for President Obama to win a second and (presumably) less politically penned-in second term, I doubt either side wants to jeopardize this channel.  Six, eight years ago, talks such as these could so easily be blown up by two very trigger happy sides.

You have to wonder whether these two ships are somehow cursed, doomed to pass in the night.  Is it so hard to just agree to a formal counter-narcotics agreement?  But, maybe the curse is that something is always there to interfere, and clearly, over the last year, that 'thing' has been Alan Gross.  U.S. officials keep hinting that we can't really move forward (but we can inch forward, perhaps?) in U.S.-Cuban relations while he remains in jail - without charges, to boot.   At the same time, the U.S. has also stubbornly declined to take any responsibility for his being there (having paid his way), or admit that when you interfere in hostile territory there are real risks.  Had Cuba given Mr. Gross his day in court, the sheer irresponsibility of the U.S. non-response might come into greater focus.

There emerged a glimmer of hope this week, as a senior State Department official expressed "cautious optimism" to reporters in Havana, based on conversations with the Cuban government, that Alan Gross may soon be tried and allowed to return home.  Reuters' Esteban Israel also spoke to a Western diplomat in Havana who predicts that Gross will be charged, plead guilty, be tried and sent home soon.  It's hard not to hope these reports bear out. 

But the big question beyond Mr. Gross's personal freedom is whether the U.S. has learned - or plans to apply - the crucial lesson of this painful episode.  This mischaracterization of Cuba's chief grievance and the nature of our USAID programming in CUba, offered by the same unnamed senior State Department official, certainly doesn't point in the right direction:

"They repeated their desire that we don't continue the programs to assist people, development programs, outreach to civil society, things that we do all over the world."

The U.S. Department of State may not agree with Cuba's position, or it may feel it doesn't have the room to move to a more traditional USAID development-focused model of aid in Cuba, but its diplomats should at a minimum handle the disagreement with greater honesty and subtlety  than this statement offers.  USAID's work in Cuba, authorized, literally, by a regime change statute, is not "development" focused, and is definitely not something we do all over the world.